from "The Mighty Eighth" – Roger Freeman Chapter 7

The twin-engine medium bomber is not generally associated with the US Eighth Army Air Force. Medium bombardment units did, however, serve operationally with the Eighth for a period during 1 943; their story being very much the story of a controversial airplane-the Martin B-26 Marauder.

The Glenn L. Martin Company was a firm of long standing for the supply of bombers to the US Forces. The B-26 Marauder, born of the Air Corps expansion prior to Pearl Harbor, promised to uphold their tradition. The prototype's maximum speed of 315 mph and ability to haul a 3,000 1b bomb load to a target 500 miles distant at 265 mph; was an impressive performance for that time.. Whereas bombers tended towards plain functional configurations, the Marauder was strikingly streamlined. Its beautiful cigar-shaped fuselage was practically devoid of projections except for Martin's own compact twin-gun power-operated turret. Two powerful Pratt and Whitney Double Wasps were encased in streamlined nacelles that also contained the main wheels of a tricycle undercarriage.

The Marauder looked good and carried a useful bomb load at fair speed, but initially did not handle well. For its time the aircraft had a high wing loading further increased by armor plate and other paraphernalia deemed essential in the light of air warfare over Europe. Thus laden, the Marauder needed longer take-off runs to become airborne.

Stalling speed advanced, necessitating faster touch-downs which the undercarriage, coupled with the added weight, was not wont to withstand. Added to this, the early Double-Wasps were prone to malfunction and at critical speeds loss of engine power meant loss of control. Unless the B-26 was quickly retrimed when an engine failed, the torque of the other engine could roll the aircraft over and into a spin.

On occasions, the propeller pitch control mechanism went wild too. All these troubles brought a soaring accident rate among first production models which, in the urgency to get the type into service, had been ordered "off the drawing board".A combination of malfunctioning and pilot inexperience, brought frequent crashes and many fatalities in training units.

Rumors grew and the tale soon spread around AAF bases that the new Martin ship was a killer-a widow maker. Some wit, remarking on the lack of wing area said the aircraft had "no visible means of support" leading to damning epithets such as "Baltimore Whore" and "Flying Prostitute".

Command concern was such that the USAAF considered abandoning development and concentrating instead upon the B-25 Mitchelf, that by contrast was ungainly, but vice free. However, work by Martin's corrected many of the troubles and design improvements were put in hand. The first two B-26 groups were sent to the South-West Pacific where they acquitted themselves well in support of operations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal before being withdrawn due to range limitations.

Since it was in Europe that aerodrome facilities and target ranges were more suited to the B-26's ability, three B-26 groups were ordered to move to England during the autumn of 1942. Ground complements crossed by sea and aircraft were flown an the North Atlantic ferry route. In September the 319th Bomb Group set out but bad weather and malfunctioning resulted in aircraft and crews being scattered along the route.

The other groups were then re-routed across the South Atlantic by which time the North African invasion had commenced and all B-26s were committed to the Twelfth Air Force for that campaign. The 319th, gathering its strength at Horsharn St Faith and Attlebridge, both near Norwich, and flying on low altitude training missions over the English countryside, was soon ordered to Africa.

On November 12th a flight set off from the south coast led by the Group Commander, Colonel Rutherford. But what was ,to have been an oversea transit flight to North Africa, brought the Marauder into its first appearance over occupied Europe. Bad weather and poor navigation brought the formation over Cherbourg where two, including the Commander's aircraft, were shot down. A third B-26, badly shot up, turned back to England to crash-land at Warmwell.

Three weeks later the ground complement of another Marauder group arrived in the UK, the first of four groups specifically assigned to the Eighth Air Force for medium bombardment operations from the UK. The Marauder force was established under the 3rd Bombardment Wing, already with headquarters installed at Elveden Hall and controlling several airfields in Suffolk and south Norfolk. While the ground personnel of the newcomer, the 322nd Group, accustomed themselves to the damp conditions at Rattlesden and Bury St Edmunds airfields, the flying crews trained and awaited combat planes 4,000 miles away in the sub-tropical climate of Florida.

( The above underline is the Group I was assigned to. The 452nd Bomb Squadron. ) Clyde D. Willis Radio operator Gunner.

The staff at Elveden Hall knew of the unfortunate affair involving the 319th, and the history of the Marauder's teething troubles. Whilst there may have been some misgivings in the staff about the aircraft scheduled to equip the wing, among lower echelons, where rumor flourished, the prospect was far from pleasing. Distorted stories of a mission over Cherbourg from which none returned, found their way to the recent arrivals at Bury and Rattlesden. Not the sort of advance publicity likely to inspire confidence in a controversial bomber yet to be battle proved in Western Europe.

Training of B-26 squadrons at home was under the auspices of Ill Bomber Command. The mode of attack practiced was low-level target approach, with the object of obtaining maximum surprise advantage. Fighter interception was always difficult at "zero" altitude, radar detection impossible, ground fire minimized, and a high degree of bombing accuracy attainable. So reasoned the advocates. In the Pacific, such tactics had met with success and AAF Headquarters saw no reason why this form of attack could not be equally effective against selected targets in occupied Europe. It was too early to establish a precedent from experience with the B-26 in North Africa, besides that, neither the Pacific nor Africa presented circumstances comparable with attacking targets across the English Channel.

The British had practiced low-level attack with considerable success and bearable losses. The RAF emphasized that speed and surprise were essential to success, The question was - had the Marauder sufficient speed? The RAF used Boston and Mosquito light bombers at low levels, preferring to send its mediums, Venturas and Mitchells, over well defended targets at medium heights (10,000 to 15,000 ft). The US Bomber Command did not enthuse over the idea, but prepared to investigate the feasibility of low level missions integrated with the heavy bomber campaign.

Not until March 7th 1943 did the first of the 322nd Group Marauders put down on Bury St Edmunds. These were from the 450th Bomb Sqdn. Approximately a month was to pass before the next squadron (452nd) arrived. (My Squadron ) The Americans, hitherto fervent advocates of a high altitude offensive, now went to the other extreme. Mediums skipped across the East Anglian plain at levels frightening to observe. One Marauder pilot, suddenly faced with overhead power cables, went under them!

Pilots found the slight time lag in control response made such flying extremely hazardous, resulting in some narrow scrapes with tree tops and cables. Nevertheless, there was no serious mishap until April 26th. On that day a B-26, practice variably action, lost part of its tail and ran into the ground near Cambridge, killing the crew of five. Accidents happened in most units, whatever their mission or equipment, and investigation of this tragedy was not allowed to hinder training, then in an advanced stage.

By the second week in May both squadrons were considered ready for action. An electrical generating plant near ljmuiden on the Dutch coast was the target selected for the May 14th premiere. By no means an "easy" target, the German Navy had made the port an E-boat base and installed substantial anti-aircraft defenses - to which the RAF could testify from experience.

During two earlier raids that month. It was planned to send twelve Marauders, each loaded with four 500 lb British delayed action bombs. Major Othel Turner, commander of 450th Squadron was to lead with Group Commander Colonel Stiliman, and Brigadier General Brady of the 3rd Wing flying in following aircraft.

Shortly after 09.50 hrs on May 14th, the first Marauder was airborne from the airfield on the hill above Bury St Edmunds-- a city steeped in English history where, six centuries before, it is said the barons met and drew up Magna Carta, first deed of democracy. The 322nd formation set out in two-plane elements, flying a few feet above the North Sea to avoid radar detection. Landfall was made near Leiden, amongst some well directed ground fire which silenced the left engine of Too Much of Texas and tore away a sizeable portion of her rudder. For a few seconds the aircraft was in jeopardy as her pilot, Lt R. C. Fry, strove to keep control, turning away from the formation to jettison bombs in the sea. This accomplished, Fry was then faced with the prospect of nursing the Marauder home across 120 miles of sea on one engine. As it happened, he was no stranger to this situation having on three previous occasions been forced to fly and land a B-26 on one engine.

The other Marauders, having turned north, followed a canal and railway track leading to ljmuiden, where the air-raid alarm sounded at 10.57 hrs. Three minutes later the eleven aircraft were over the target and away. Ground fire of varying intensity followed the formation from the coast and every aircraft but one received some damage, chiefly from small caliber weapons.

On regaining the Suffolk coast Fry had put down at Great Ashfield and another damaged B-26 made for Honington, while a third was so badly crippled that Lt. John J. Howell ordered his crew to bale out near their home base. Before Howell could himself jump the aircraft crashed out of control at Rougham. Some of the heaviest damage had been sustained by the aircraft of the 452nd's Squadron Commander, Major G. C. Celio. Finding one main undercarriage leg would not lower, due to hits on the mechanism, the Major circled his airfield for eighty minutes while hydraulic pressure was restored. Altogether some 300 holes were counted in his aircraft. Major Turner in the leading B-26 was one of seven men wounded during the raid.

Though executed much as according to plan the returning crews were understandably not particularly enthusiastic about low-level attack. On the other hand, they felt confident that a good job of bombing had been done: their confidence, how- ever, was soon shattered. Two days later Colonel Stiliman attended a meeting at Elveden Hall where he was told his bombers had missed the target and that a return visit was planned next day. Stiliman did not like the idea of going back to ljmuiden so soon and said so.

His protest was considered but Command did not think it valid, particularly as the raid had been planned as an integral part of extensive operations over Europe next day and target alterations were not desirable at such a late hour. Those who participated in the first mission, could not believe the objective was missed. They conjectured that the Germans had removed some of the delayed action bombs. Long afterwards the truth was known; all bombs, though near, had failed to hit the plant.

The Field Order that came through to the 322nd Group Operations Staff on the night of May 16th called for twelve aircraft loaded as before. This time the force was to split after crossing the enemy coast, one half going to Ijmuiden and the other to another generating station at nearby Haarlem. With many aircraft still under flak damage repairs, Stiliman could only muster eleven serviceable B-26s from the two squadrons. A third squadron, the 451st, had just flown in but its aircraft were still in need of ETO modifications.

Tensions preceding combat missions were made all the worse by the apprehension of returning to Ijmuiden. Take-off commenced at 10.56 hrs and once assembled the formation soon disappeared eastwards in the bright spring sunshine. Sometime after noon one Marauder returned. The pilot reported that he had been forced to turn back some thirty miles off the Dutch coast on discovering that his generators were not functioning. As the return time (12.50 hrs) for the bombers passed, an uneasy feeling grew with General Brady and others waiting at the control tower. Then came the moment when fuel would have been exhausted and the aircraft could no longer be in flight. Some cherished the hope that the Marauders had put down on another airfield, but checking soon showed this not to be the case. At V1ll Bomber Command, the force was listed 'Missing in Action, cause unknown'.

A reconnaissance revealed no evidence that bombing took place. In the meantime, it was found that the aborting Marauder had climbed to 1000 ft on turning back. While gaining altitude was normal safety procedure in such circumstances, at over 1 000 ft the aircraft had been clearly visible on RAF radar screens and presumably on the enemy's as well. Thus, it could be assumed the German defenses were forewarned. Then, five days after the raid a Royal Navy destroyer came upon two exhausted airmen huddled in a dinghy some miles off the East Anglican coast. The two were Sgts. George Williams and Jesse Lewis, tail and turret gunners, and sole survivors of a B-26 that had come down in the sea. From their stories and information later received from intelligence sources much of the disaster was reconstructed.

From the outset the formation had blundered, through a wrong heading or a gross navigational error, so that landfall occurred some thirty miles south of the point planned. The formation then crossed the mouth of the Maas, one of the most heavily defended areas of Holland, where Colonel Stiliman's bomber was hit and crashed out of control into sand dunes at Rozenburg.

A minute later flak claimed another B-26, which fell into the Meuse near Maasluis. The remaining Marauders survived the hail of small arms and light flak and in some confusion continues north-east on a heading that would take them 25 to 30 miles east of their objectives. The leader of the second element accelerated to assume the command position, but in so doing collided with Stiliman's wingman, causing both B-26s to crash at Bodegraven. Debris from the collision or flak damage received earlier, caused another bomber to "belly in' a few miles on.

Hopelessly lost, the remaining Marauders blundered into the defenses of Amsterdam, bombed a gas holder and headed west. Four were so badly damaged that they got little further than the coast and fell into the sea. The remaining Marauder had progressed fifty miles on the homeward journey when it was attacked head on by three Mel Ogs. After a second pass by the fighters, it went into the sea, sinking in 45 seconds. This was the bomber from which the two gunners survived.

Of the 62 airmen who came down in enemy territory, twenty survived as prisoners of war. Lt Col Purinton, group executive and leader of the Haarlem attack, was rescued with his crew from the sea by an enemy boat, while from the mangled wreckage of Stiliman's bomber the Germans extracted the 322nd's Commander and two gunners alive but badly injured. Clyde D. Willis and Robert Freeman the two who was taken POW .